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Preface 
Some five years from the Millennium Declaration we are faced with the inevitable need to reassess the 
current levels of poverty, the instruments that are in place for tackling poverty and indeed the constraints that 
must be resolved. The fact that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent an unprecedented 
commitment by all nations and institutions, including the International monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, to implement and realize the MDG goals and targets needs to continue to be emphasized at all 
stages. Part of the global ability to realize the MDGs is dependent on financing of such development. Aside 
being affirmed as part of Goal Eight in the MDGs such understanding has also been reaffirmed in the 2002 
Monterrey consensus on enhancing financing for development. 
MDGs are unique in that they represent the first global compact between the heads of state of developed 
and developing countries, together with the UN system, the World Bank and the IMF.1 The Goals have 
clear targets and achievable time-bound indicators of success, which can galvanize support among 
citizens and governments alike. Throughout 2005, civil society organizations, governments and multilat-
eral institutions will be focused on progress in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with 
ten years remaining until the target year of 2015. Tanzania is not an exception to this. 
The MDGs include a 50% reduction in poverty and hunger, universal primary education, reduction of child 
mortality by two-thirds, cutbacks in maternal mortality by three-quarters, promotion of gender equality, and 
reversal of the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. A Millennium Summit of 189 world leaders 
in September 2000 pledged to meet all of these goals by 2015. A summit later this year will review progress 
towards the goals and set the development agenda for the next decade. 
Of particular importance to this research report is Goal Eight outlining Northern governments' commit-
ment to a global partnership for development - a late addition to the MDGs. Goal Eight relates to issues of 
- debt cancellation, trade justice, equitable governance in global institutions, and political, social and 
economic rights for the poor - as an indispensable foundation for a politics that will enable sustained 
progress to end poverty in the South. It is an important goal for holding developed countries accountable in 
advancing the MDGs. This goal is particularly significant as it requires richer countries to reform their 
policies and actions to contribute to the fight against poverty. 
Developing countries such as Tanzania will not be able to mobilize enough resources to attain the MDGs 
by 2015 unless there are radical changes in terms of aid administration, international trade and the reso-
lution of the burgeoning debt crisis. One big problem is the conditionality aspects embedded in the coun-
try's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the centre and key to the much needed development aid. 
The PRSP itself is not an adequate funding criteria; neither is it an important tool in MDG attainment2; it is 
dependent on a country having a PRGF programme and meeting all the conditions and benchmarks in the 
PRGF which are not contained in the PRSP but are hiding in the Letter of Intent between the government 
and the IMF. Thus the content of the Letter of Intent is also crucial to attainment of the MDGs. Unless the 
MDG targets are also included in the IMF and World Bank instruments, the attainment of MDGs will remain 
a dream. 
After several United Nations (UN) Conferences, in 1996 donors, acting on their own, agreed on a plan of 
action in a document called Shaping the 21st Century in which they laid the foundations for seven of the 
MDGs. Notably absent were any time-bound targets or policy commitments to take action on enabling 
policies with respect to debt, trade, reconsideration of donor-imposed structural adjustment or ODA financ-
ing, which were very important to developing countries. 
1 Salil Shetty in Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice, "Human Rights Perspectives on the MDGs, Conference Report", 
November 11,2003, pp. 17-18 accessed at http://www.nvuhr.org/imaqes/NYUCHRGJMDGREPORT2003.pdf 
2 See n from the examination of all the letters of Intent with the IMF 
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In fact, developing countries had no role in setting the goals in Shaping the 21st Century, and subsequently 
in assessing progress. Between 1996 and 2000, Shaping the 21s' Century was strongly criticized by civil 
society. It was seen to be a deliberate attempt by developed country governments to avoid the more difficult 
structural issues of more equitable economic relationships and the urgent need for reform of global 
governance. The Millennium Declaration represents a ratification of the donors' thinking by including 
developing countries and the global partnership goal (Goal Eight). 
It is important to note that the global structures that maintain poverty and marginalise the rights of the 
poorest clearly need reform, but there is little attention to these major framework issues in Northern govern-
ments' approaches to the MDGs. The UN should play a strong role in regular monitoring of the Donor 
countries' progress on Goal Eight and the framework for their reporting on MDG Eight should be revised to 
include indicators on global governance and participation. 
While a more equitable trade system is vital, donor Official Development Assistance (ODA), along with 
substantial debt cancellation, provides the essential additional financing capacities, particularly for the 
poorest countries' progress in reducing and eliminating poverty. Now is the time for the North to honour 
mutual commitments and obligations in a sprit of genuine solidarity. Such commitments are encapsulated 
in the Millennium Development Goals - in particular Goal Eight. 
Charles MUTASA 
AFRODAD Acting Executive Director 
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Execut ive S u m m a r y 
n 2005 the United Nations takes stock of the implementation status of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) around the world. The MDGs are the first universal time-bound benchmarks to which to 
hold governments accountable. For many of the world's poorest countries, including Tanzania, the pic-
ture is bleak and 2015 is beginning to look more and more like a mirage. Achieving MDGs in Tanzania 
could bring about dramatic changes to the lives of millions of people now living below the poverty line and 
would be a big step in the country's strategy for total poverty eradication as envisioned in its Vision 2025. 
S u m m a r y of F ind ings 
Some five years into the MDGs programme, Tanzania has made little progress in meeting the goals, 
particularly in poverty reduction. What is particularly worrying is that even in the long term, there is little 
evidence that any positive changes will be made. The study focused on intermediate outcomes, i.e., the 
strategies and policy framework being pursued to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction and 
the results that have been achieved, Below is a summary of the major findings, recommendations and 
lessons to be drawn from them. 
• Donors have not been responsive to the government's programming process. ODA disbursement 
is often late, coming after Tanzania's national budget process. This delays the implementation of 
poverty reduction programmes. Donor funding is also inadequate and does not cover recurrent 
costs, which comprise the bulk of government expenditure in the priority sectors. Further, Tanza-
nia's debt burden is increasing at an alarming rate although it is on the HIPC Initiative. There is 
evidence that even after the HIPC relief, debt sustainability levels will not be reached. 
• Donor-imposed "Washington Consensus" policies remain at the heart of Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Papers (PRSPs). The poorest countries are required to prepare PRSPs, under the guidance of 
the World Bank and the IMF, in order to qualify for loans or debt relief. PRSPs are increasingly used 
by donors as a guide to achieving the MDGs, under the largely rhetorical claim by donors that these 
strategies are "owned" by developing countries. 
• Donor-imposed aid conditions affect the achievability of the MDGs in at least two respects. First, 
aid conditions are the tools with which the IMF and World Bank act as gatekeepers of aid channels 
based on their assessment of compliance to their policy prescriptions. Secondly, bilateral donors 
channel significant MDG aid resources into highly conditioned budget support for implementing a 
country's PRSP or into Sector Wide Programs in support of a line-ministry program in education, 
health or agriculture.3 The HIPC study also identified some cross-cutting issues, which include 
HIV/AIDS, environment, gender and governance4. Tanzania is implementing the MDGs under its 
PRS priority areas framework. Some of the priority targets are more ambitious than the MDGs while 
others are within the MDG target framework. 
• After years of implementing World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programmes, the government's 
role in Tanzania's economy has changed radically. From being a central player in the economy, the 
government has now been pushed to the sidelines where it is supposed to play the role of a 
facilitator and to provide only essential social services. Under the IMF's Enhanced Structural Ad-
justment Facility (ESAF) in early 1996 and later Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 
1999 the government embarked on a wide range of parastatal and public sector reforms. As part of 
the parastatal reforms, the government privatized about half the country's 400 parastatals while 
public sector reforms resulted in the reduction of the government work force from 355 000 in 1992 
to 270 000 in 19975. 
3 Brian Tomlinson & Pam Foster, (2004) "At the Table or in the Kitchen? CIDA's New Aid Strategies, Developing Country Ownership 
and Donor Conditionality", a joint paper for CCIC and the Halifax Initiative, September 2004. 
4 Millennium Project 2004 P.24 
5TAS1999 p.6 
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• Tanzania is implementing its poverty reduction programme with IMF support through a three-year 
PRGF arrangement which extends to June 2006. Under this programme, Tanzania has received 
US$189 million6 to finance economic reforms. The broad macroeconomic objectives supported 
under the PRGF include the improvement of tax policy and administration, financial sector reform, 
improvement of the investment environment and governance. The latest PRGF-supported pro-
gramme has committed Tanzania to contain inflation at about 4 % and raise real GDP growth 
further (from the 6.2 % achieved in 2003). According to the project documents, the growth will be 
underpinned by substantial investments in physical infrastructure as outlined in the Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper. 
• Under the programme the country will be expected to: mobilize revenue to strengthen domestic 
savings and reduce aid dependency; further liberalize the trade regime to enhance efficiency and 
strengthen the tradable sector; and improve the economy's supply response by removing key 
impediments to growth, including measures to improve the efficiency of the financial sector and 
promote private sector development. In support of the programme's medium-term revenue target, 
the Tanzania government has taken a range of measures to bolster tax administration, including 
adopting a new medium-term corporate plan for the Tanzania Revenue Authority, refocusing man-
agement and administrative resources to facilitate the broadening of the tax base; revamping the 
administration of VAT and presumptive taxation, and broadening the tax base by reducing the 
number of exemptions. As a result of these measures, government revenue was consistently above 
estimates during the first three quarters of the fiscal year 2002/03, and grew by 18 % over the same 
period the previous year. The most notable features were the strong revenue performance of VAT 
on domestic goods and of income tax. Taxes on petroleum imports however recorded a negative 
growth over the previous year 
• Tanzania government's expenditure in 2003 was US$2.6 billion7, or 89 % of estimates. The 
underperformance was due to delays in loan disbursements, which reduced the resource enve-
lope; slow execution of discretionary expenditure and delays in procurement (URT 2004). Notwith-
standing the shortfall in foreign financing, priority sectors received their full quarterly allocations. 
The government's net domestic borrowing in 2003 amounted to US$284 million 
• Tanzania has failed to harness the country's agricultural potential for poverty reduction because of 
lack of access to national and regional markets for most small scale farmers because of poor rural 
transport infrastructure of the inefficiencies resulting from excessive government intervention in the 
economy. Policy-related constraints continue to impede the development of the sector despite 
economic reform measures that have been underway for nearly two decades8 
• Tanzania is one of the most donor-dependent countries in the world with between 25 - 45 % of the 
total Government budget and 80 % of the development budget dependent on foreign aid in the form 
of grants, consessional loans and debt relief. Tanzania has development cooperation programmes 
with over 50 donors, international financial institutions and NGOs covering hundreds of projects in 
virtually all sectors9. In 2001, total ODA commitments to Tanzania were US$1,440 million. In the 
2004/2005 budget, 45 % of the total financing was from donors. While it is difficult to allocate 
specific aid flows to specific MDGs and to identify the aid which is contributing to MDG achieve-
ment, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has developed a methodology to 
allocate ODA commitments to individual MDGs. Using that methodology, the UN Millennium Project 
estimates that roughly 60 % of these ODA commitments were devoted to areas directly related to 
the MDGs 
• The developed world committed themselves to the 0.7% target, (that 0.7% of its gross national 
6 PRGF loans carry an annul interest rate of 0.5 % and are repayable over 10 years with a 51/2-year grace period on principal 
payments. 
7 Budget Digest 2004/05 p.8 
8 Millenium Project p. 72 
9TAS1999 
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income (GNI) would be spent on international development). The promise was made in 1970. 
Unless this target is met attaining MDGs in countries like Tanzania remains a mirage.The quality 
of aid continues to be affected by the tying of donor aid disbursements to donor country goods and 
services. Most aid flows to Tanzania were made conditional on the government privatizing the 
water system in towns such as Dar es Salaam. The move has increased water prices and made 
poor populations more vulnerable to water borne diseases like cholera. Such aid is contrary to the 
spirit and letter of attaining MDGs by 2015 in Africa 
• The MDG approach has the potential to encourage the development of a country-owned and 
credible long-term strategy for growth and poverty reduction. But the policy- making process falls 
far short of the potential 
This is partly because implementation of the MDGs is still driven by the PRGF's macro economic 
framework and poverty reduction strategy, which is pegged on the HIPC initiative. There is also a 
lack of basic policy priorities and operational framework that should be pursued under the MDG 
framework to break from the poverty trap 
• There was no broad participation in the policy realignment of the MDGs with other major policy 
documents, including Vision 2025, Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) and PRSPs. Many of the 
stakeholders interviewed on the process said it had not been open. Lack of popular participation 
was also cited in the drafting of the macroeconomic framework under the PRGF. However, partici-
patory processes were used in the formulation of the PRSP, which is the main instrument for 
implementing the national action plan for poverty reduction under the MDG framework 
• MDGs have had a limited impact in generating meaningful discussions and participation, outside 
the narrow official circles. This reflects in part the continued implementation of PRGF and PRSP, 
which are conditional for donor support, as well as low awareness among the major stakeholder 
about the importance of MDGs 
• Of the eight MDGs, Tanzania has adopted five as priorities in its major policy documents and 
national action plans. These include Education, Health, Agriculture, HIV/AIDS, Water and Infra-
structure. Environment and Gender are treated as cross cutting issues 
• Apart from education where tremendous strides have been made in recent years, progress on the 
rest of the goals has fallen behind or stagnated. Little headway has been made in poverty reduction; 
agricultural productivity is declining and the proportion of people under threat from hunger is on the 
rise. The nutritional status of children, especially those under-fives, is precarious while chronic 
malnutrition remains a widespread problem with 44 % of children moderately to severely stunted, 
suggesting problems in the general health status of children. Survival indicators of poverty are not 
encouraging. For instance, no substantial progress has been made in the reduction of infant and 
under-five mortality and maternal mortality. There are even indications of slight increases in recent 
years. The proportion of births that were attended by trained personnel and those that took place in 
health facilities have both declined and urban-rural disparities in service provision has increased in 
the past three years10 
• The MDGs focus on income and human poverty. This includes addressing constraints in the 
broader sectors of the economy to bring about poverty reducing growth. But the primary focus of 
Tanzania's PRSP - the main implementing instrument - is on the composition of public expendi-
tures, especially social sector spending. It lays less emphasis on broader strategies that would 
encourage poverty-reducing growth, such as land reforms. Even in the area of public expenditure, 
the operational value of the PRSP is limited because of the nature of costing and prioritization that 
is defined by the cash budget framework which only reflects the adjusted cost to meet the budget 
ceiling rather than the actual cost. 
10 Tanzania PRSII2004 
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1.0 In t roduc t ion 
Tanzania is one of the world's poorest countries with an annual per capita income of about US$250. The country has a population of 33 million, which is growing at about 2.8 per cent per year. Tanzania's 
economy is heavily dependent on agriculture which accounts for 50 per cent of GDP and 85 % of exports. 
The country's heavy dependence on agriculture makes it vulnerable to climatic changes, notably floods 
and droughts, with some regions being particularly drought prone. Industry accounts for 15 per cent of 
GDP, while the tourism sector has recorded significant growth in recent years. The mining sector has 
good potential but is still under-exploited. 
Poverty in Tanzania is characterised by low income and expenditure, high mortality and morbidity, poor 
nutritional status, low educational attainment, vulnerability to external shocks and exclusion from eco-
nomic, social and political processes. The most at risk are young children and youths, the very old, 
women, large house holds and those involved in subsistence agriculture, livestock production and small 
scale fishing. 
Tanzania's main development challenge is to tackle the widespread and persistent poverty. Some 48 % of 
the population lives below the basic poverty line. Income poverty in Tanzania is severe and is rising. The 
number of people below the national basic needs poverty line increased from 9.5 million in 1991/92 to 
11.4 million in 2001/2002. Over the same period the number of people below the food poverty line rose 
from 5.4 million to 6.0 million (URT 1993, 2003a). Poverty in Tanzania is concentrated in the rural areas. 
Based on a projected economic growth rate of 8 %, Tanzania's Vision 2025 predicts that the country will 
graduate from least developed country to a middle income country by 2025. The government has targeted 
50 per cent reduction in the proportion of people living in poverty by 2010 and eliminating poverty by 
202511. 
• 
The Millennium Declaration calls on governments "to spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and 
children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty". The MDGs' Goal Eight, while 
a late addition to the MDGs, responds to this obligation. Goal Eight has a number of related targets and 
indicators for measuring progress: 
A i d F lows: 
1. Net ODA and ODA to the least developed countries (total and share of GNI); 
2. Proportion of bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors for basic social services (basic 
education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water, and sanitation); 
3. Proportion of Untied ODA. 
Marke t A c c e s s : 
1. Proportion of developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries 
and from least developed countries, admitted free of duty; 
2. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing 
from developing countries; 
3. Agricultural support for OECD countries as a %age of their GDP; and 
4. Proportion of ODA for building trade capacity; 
11 TAS1999p.4 
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Debt Susta inabi l i ty : 
1. Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC Decision Points and that have reached 
their HIPC Completion Points (cumulative); 
2. Debt relief committed under HIPC Initiative; and 
3. Debt service as a %age of exports of goods and services. 
These targets and indicators largely fail to take into account the need for deep reform in the relationships 
between developed and developing countries that might form the basis for an authentic development 
partnership. With respect to trade and market access indicators, CSOs have been critical of their narrow 
focus on market access as the sole measure of the contribution of trade policy to reducing poverty. 
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2.0 M a c r o E c o n o m i c F r a m e w o r k 
Tanzania has recorded positive economic growth in recent years. From 2000-2004, real GDP growth averaged 5.6 % a year compared to a mere 2.7 % during 1990-95. Over the period, inflation has fallen 
to below 5 % from about 30 %. Fiscal imbalances have been reduced, expenditures reoriented to the 
social sectors and the external position substantially strengthened. Based on a projected economic 
growth of 8%, the Vision 2025 predicts that Tanzania will graduate from least developed country to a 
middle income country by 2025. Tanzania government has targeted a 50 % reduction in the proportion of 
people living in poverty by 2010 and eliminating poverty by 202512. 
But these economic achievements have been at a high price. Budget deficit reduction has been largely 
achieved through expenditure cuts while the implementation of a cash budget has curtailed the govern-
ment's capacity to deliver adequate quality services in the basic social services and infrastructure. Struc-
tural reforms to address the economic weaknesses have been weak and inadequate. 
Table 1 Selected Economic Indicator 
Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
GDP Growth 4,90 5,70 5,90 6,20 6,30 
GDP Per capita 2,20 3,40 4,20 3,50 4,00 
Consumer Prices 5,90 5,20 4,6 5,00 5,00 
2.1 Tanzan ia ' s M D G Strategy 
The approach the Tanzanian government took in the implementation of the MDGs begun with the locali-
sation of MDGs into various national policy documents. This was prompted by the government's desire to 
fight poverty, meet its international obligations and to realize the goals given the resource constraints it is 
facing. Documents outlining various components of the MDG plans include the Tanzania Assistance 
Strategy (TAS), the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES); and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP). 
2.1.2 Pover ty Reduct ion St ra tegy Paper 
Donor-imposed "Washington Consensus" policies remain at the heart of Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs). The poorest countries are required to prepare PRSPs, under the guidance of the World 
Bank and the IMF, in order to qualify for loans or debt relief. PRSPs are increasingly used by donors as a 
guide to achieving the MDGs, under the largely rhetorical claim by donors that these strategies are 
"owned" by developing countries. 
Tanzania developed its PRSP in 2000 after it had qualified for the HIPC Initiative debt relief programme. 
The PRSP acts as the national action plan for the implementation of the Vision 2025 and the NPES. It is 
also the main reference point for anti poverty initiatives and an instrument to build consensus on national 
priorities for poverty reduction and its development agenda. The PRSP identifies major priority areas 
which are key to achieving the MDGs. These include agriculture, primary education, rural roads, water 
and sanitation, and health. 
In the analysis of the relationship between the PRSPs and the MDGs therefore, it is important to bear in 
mind the following: 
12TAS1999 p.4 
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• The PRSPs are yet to become really country owned because they remain a prescription of the IFIs. 
If they are not a prescription, they are a tool of micro-managing the countries13 on implementation 
of stabilization and structural adjustment policies; through letters of Intent and their Memoranda of 
Economic and Financial policies; 
• PRGF policies are not any different from the largely discredited SAP policies and their negative 
impact on people's lives. An ongoing analysis of the actual policy benchmarks and how they affect 
the attainment of MDGs is going to be increasingly important. 
• The fact that HIPC triggers allude to education and health could be because the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) have come under increasing pressure to let go their policies of user and 
school fees that are known to have reversed people's access to these basic human needs in the 
past. 
Donor-imposed aid conditions affect the achievability of the MDGs in at least two respects. First, aid 
conditions are the tools with which the IMF and World Bank act as gatekeepers of aid channels based on 
their assessment of compliance to their policy prescriptions. Secondly, bilateral donors channel signifi-
cant MDG aid resources into highly conditioned budget support for implementing a country's PRSP or 
into Sector Wide Programs in support of a line-ministry program in education, health or agriculture.14 The 
HIPC also identified some cross-cutting issues, which include HIV/AIDS, environment, gender and gov-
ernance16. Tanzania is implementing the MDGs under its PRS priority areas framework. Some of the 
priority targets are more ambitious than the MDGs while others are within the MDG target framework. 
Rather than strengthen citizens' engagement in the determination of political choices favouring poor and 
marginalized communities, donors depoliticize development options by engaging in largely technocratic 
discussions with specialized government officials. Currently donors are constructing a "globalized" aid 
regime with global conditionalities for which no one donor accepts responsibility.16 These conditions 
relate more closely to donor pre-occupations with improving government's fiduciary accountability and 
policy compliance than with effective engagement of local populations for improved poverty outcomes. 
The several donors supporting the Tanzania General Budget Support Program, for example, have im-
posed 50 prior actions, which require progress before the release of donor funds, and 60 additional results 
related to Tanzania's PRSP that are systematically reviewed by the Tanzanian government. Externally set 
conditions are increasingly penetrating deep into all levels of government processes, while largely ex-
cluding citizens from influencing the directions of their own government. 
2.1.3 T h e Tanzan ia A s s i s t a n c e Strategy 
The TAS is a national development framework to manage national resources to achieve the development 
strategies stated in the Vision 2025, through the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) and the 
PRSP17. The TAS aims to promote good governance, transparency, capacity building and effectiveness in 
aid delivery. It was created to harmonise donor procurement procedures and systems, coordinate project 
support from donors, manage the disbursement of resources outside the exchequer and synchronise the 
country assistance strategy. The TAS' objective is to ensure that donor support is directed towards budget 
support and to reduce the number of donors the government has to deal with in a given priority sector. TAS 
provides a framework from which all donors funding a given priority area can negotiate with the govern-
ment on the modalities. 
13 In the Letter of Intent between Cameroon and the IMF, Cameroon is expected to Report to the IMF on a monthly and quarterly basis 
on some of the issues agreed on. It may not be unlikely that the Cameroonian government reports more to the IMF than to its own 
Parliament. 
14 Brian Tomlinson & Pam Foster, (2004) "At the Table or in the Kitchen? CIDA's New Aid Strategies, Developing Country Ownership 
and Donor Conditionality", a joint paper for CCIC and the Halifax Initiative, September 2004. 
15 Millennium Project 2004 P.24 
16 Hall, D and de la Motte, R, (2004) "Dogmatic Development: Privatization and Conditionality in Six Countries" a Public Service 
Research Unit Report for War on Want, February 2004, 
17 URT1999 
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3.0 E c o n o m i c Pol icy R e s p o n s e 
After years of implementing World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programmes, the government's role in Tanzania's economy has changed radically. From being a central player in the economy, the 
government has now been pushed to the sidelines where it is supposed to play the role of a facilitator and 
to provide only essential social services. 
Under the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in early 1996 and later Poverty Reduc-
tion and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999 the government embarked on a wide range of parastatal and 
public sector reforms. As part of the parastatal reforms, the government privatized about half the country's 
400 parastatals while public sector reforms resulted in the reduction of the government work force from 
355 000 in 1992 to 270 000 in 199718. 
Tanzania is implementing its poverty reduction programme with IMF support through a three-year PRGF 
arrangement which extends to June 2006. Under this programme, Tanzania has received US$189 mil-
lion19 to finance economic reforms. The broad macroeconomic objectives supported under the PRGF 
include the improvement of tax policy and administration, financial sector reform, improvement of the 
investment environment and governance. The latest PRGF-supported programme has committed Tan-
zania to contain inflation at about 4 % and raise real GDP growth further (from the 6.2 % achieved in 2003). 
According to the project documents, the growth will be underpinned by substantial investments in physical 
infrastructure as outlined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Under the programme the country will 
be expected to: 
Mobilize revenue to strengthen domestic savings and reduce aid dependency: 
• further liberalize the trade regime to enhance efficiency and strengthen the tradable sector; and 
• Improve the economy's supply response by removing key impediments to growth, including meas-
ures to improve the efficiency of the financial sector and promote private sector development. 
In support of the programme's medium-term revenue target, the authorities have taken a range of meas-
ures to bolster tax administration, including adopting a new medium-term corporate plan for the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority, refocusing management and administrative resources to facilitate the broadening of 
the tax base; revamping the administration of VAT and presumptive taxation, and broadening the tax base 
by reducing the number of exemptions. As a result of these measures, government revenue was consist-
ently above estimates during the first three quarters of the fiscal year 2002/03, and grew by 18 % over the 
same period the previous year. The most notable features were the strong revenue performance of VAT on 
domestic goods and of income tax. Taxes on petroleum imports however recorded a negative growth over 
the previous year. 
Total government expenditure in 2003 was US$2.6 billion20, or 89 % of estimates. The underperformance 
was due to delays in loan disbursements, which reduced the resource envelope; slow execution of 
discretionary expenditure and delays in procurement (URT 2004). Notwithstanding the shortfall in foreign 
financing, priority sectors received their full quarterly allocations. The government's net domestic borrow-
ing in 2003 amounted to US$284 million. 
3.1.1 Agr icu l ture 
Agriculture is the backbone of Tanzania's economy contributing about 70 per cent of the country's export 
and providing a livelihood for about 80 % of the population. Agriculture has high linkages with the non-farm 
sector through forward linkages to agro-processing, consumption and exports. However the performance 
of this sector has not been impressive in recent years. Agriculture's contribution GDP has grown at 3.3 % 
per year since 1985. Considering that the overall GDP growth target for halving abject poverty by 2010 is 
in the range of 6-7 %, the agriculture sector is under-performing21. 
18TAS1999 p.6 
19 PRGF loans carry an annul interest rate of 0.5 % and are repayable over 10 years with a 5 Vtyear grace period on principal 
payments. 
20 Budget Digest 2004/05 p.8 
21 TAS2002P.13 
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The majority of Tanzania's small-scale farmers rely on rain-fed agriculture with only 3.3 % of total cropland 
under irrigation (FAO 2003a). As a result, annual agricultural output is highly variable with an average 
variation from the mean of over 9 % during 1992-2001, compared to a world average variation of only 3.5 
% (FAO 2003a). Given the low levels of food production, this high variability leads to severe periodical food 
shortages in parts of the country. 
Tanzania, has failed to harness the country's agricultural potential for poverty reduction largely because of 
the inefficiencies resulting from excessive government intervention in the economy. Policy-related con-
straints continue to impede the development of the sector despite economic reform measures that have 
been underway for nearly two decades. 
Other factors responsible for the sector's poor performance include the lack of access to national and 
regional markets for most small scale farmers because of poor rural transport infrastructure.22 
Appropriate agriculture policies will be a key determinant of progress for the hunger/poverty Goal. There 
is general consensus that halving the number of hungry persons by 2015 (not just the proportion) is entirely 
achievable.23 But the approaches to agricultural development in both developed and developing coun-
tries and the emphasis on expanding export-oriented and corporate models of agriculture in the South will 
not be the basis for achieving this Goal. Trade and investment agreements must provide policy space for 
communities and governments to enact their own food security frameworks in support of small scale 
producers. 
3.1.2 Off icial D e v e l o p m e n t Ass is tance ( O D A ) 
Tanzania is one of the most donor-dependent countries in the world with between 25- 45 % of the total 
Government budget and 80 % of the development budget dependent on foreign aid in the form of grants, 
consessional loans and debt relief. Tanzania has development cooperation programmes with over 50 
donors, international financial institutions and NGOs covering hundreds of projects in virtually all sec-
tors24. 
In 2001, total ODA commitments to Tanzania were US$1,440 million. In the 2004/2005 budget, 45 % of the 
total financing was from donors. While it is difficult to allocate specific aid flows to specific MDGs and to 
identify the aid which is contributing to MDG achievement, the OECD Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) has developed a methodology to allocate ODA commitments to individual MDGs. Using that 
methodology, the UN millennium project estimates that roughly 60 % of these ODA commitments were 
devoted to areas directly related to the MDGs. 
22 Millenium Project p. 72 
23 Millennium Project Taskforce on Hunger, Halving Hunger: It Can be Done, London: Earthscan, 2005, http://unmp.forumone.com/ 
eng task force/HungerEbook.pdf and the International Food Policy Research Institute at http://vww.ifpri.org/ 
24 TAS 1999 
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Table 2: A Comparison of Tanzania's PRSPs and MDGs 
MDG MDG Target Tanzania's PRSP Goal 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger 
Reduce by half the proportion of people 
living on less than a dollar a day 
a. Reduce proportion of population 
below the poverty line by half from 
35.7% in 2000/01 to 17.8%by 2010 
Reduce by half the proportion of people 
who suffer from hunger b. Reduce the proportion of food 
poor by half from 18.7% in 2000/01 
to 9.3% by 2010 
c. Reduce the prevalence of 
stunting from 43.4% in 1999 to 20% 
by 2010 
d. Reduce the prevalence of 
wasting from 7.2% in 1999 to 2% 
by 2010 
2. Achieve Universal Primary 
Education 
a. Ensure that all boys and girls complete 
a full course of primary schooling 
a. Increase primary net enrolment 
from 85% in 2002 to 90% by 2005 
b. Reduce illiteracy by 100% by 
2010 
3. Promote gender equality 
and empower women 
a. Achieve gender equality in 
primary, secondary and tertiary 
education, preferably by 2005 and no 
later than 2015. 
a. Achieve gender equality in 
primary and secondary education 
by 2005 
4. Reduce Child Mortality a. Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 
and 2015, the under-five mortality rate 
a. Reduce infant mortality from 99 
per 1000 in 1997 to 50 per 1000 by 
2010 and 20 per 1000 by 2025 
5. Improve Maternal Health a. Reduce by three-quarters, between 
1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality 
ratio 
a. Reduce maternal mortality by 
half from 529 per 100,000 in 1994 
to 265 per 100,000 by 2010 
b. Increase births attended by a 
skilled health worker from 36% 
in1999 to 80% by 2010 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other diseases 
a. Have halted by 2015 and begun to 
reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
b. Have halted by 2015 and begun to 
reverse the incidence of malaria and 
other major diseases 
No clear target 
a. Decrease the rate of malaria in 
patient fatality rate from 12.8% in 
1999 to 8% in 2010. 
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7. Ensure Environmental a. Integrate the principles of 
Sustainability sustainable development into country 
policies and programme and reverse the 
loss of environmental resources 
b. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of 
people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water 
c. Have achieved, by 2020, a 
significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers 
Increase the provision of clean 
water access in rural areas from 
48.5% in 2000 to 85% of the 
population by 2010 
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4.0 Impact of A id on Tanzan ia 
Increased aid levels have been touted as critical elements for the achievement of MDGs. Equally impor tant, though, is the aid efficiency, which measures the quality of the aid, what it is used for and how it is 
used. In the case of Tanzania, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of aid, given the 
country's long association with donors and the high aid levels it has received over time. 
Although Tanzania remains one of the poorest countries in the world, since independence it has received 
the highest levels of aid on the continent. For instance, while ODA accounted for 10.1 per cent of Tanza-
nia's GNP in 1985 the proportion of aid in its GNP had shot up to 69.3 % by 1989/90. By comparison, the 
figure for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole was 5%.25 
For aid to be considered effective, it should make a positive impact on income levels and on poverty 
reduction. But in the case of Tanzania, despite the country's heavy reliance on aid, per capita income has 
shrunk. In 1976, the country had a per capita income of US$180, which rose to US$250 in 1986 before 
dropping drastically to US$90 in 1993, making Tanzania the second poorest country in the world at the 
time. In 1996, with a per capita income of US$170, Tanzania still had not regained its income level of 20 
years earlier.26 
Between 1988 and 1997, Tanzania received a net ODA total of US$10 billion, which was more than any 
other country in the region received.27 But the aid did not improve people's lives. According to the World 
Bank, between 1977 and 1996, Tanzania's life expectancy declined from 51 to 50 years while, per capita 
consumption dropped annually by 0.8 per cent between 1990 and 1996.28 
Aid critics point out that high levels of donor assistance "suffocated" and overwhelmed the self-help efforts 
of the Tanzanian people making them aid dependent and unable to work for themselves. They say the 
high volume of assistance from international finance institutions and the poor return on capital deployed 
have resulted in Tanzania being regarded as a highly indebted country while the repayment of loans 
granted in the context of structural adjustment programmes have become the country's greatest financial 
burden.29 
But on the other hand, one may also want to look at whether aid has been used in the most effective way 
or whether donors have worked in a coordinated manner to ensure poverty reducing outcomes. Evidence 
on the ground shows that this has not been the case as donors continue to work separately, creating huge 
problems of harmonization and coordination. According to the 2004 World Development Report, Tanza-
nia is in active dialogue with more than 50 aid organizations that send more than 1000 delegations and 
ask for more than 2000 reports each year. This is costly and time consuming, using resources that would 
be better spent on poverty reduction.30 
Efforts at donor coordination and harmonization have been going on for some time but have gathered 
momentum in recent years. The Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) sets out the framework for strength-
ening aid/donor co-ordination, harmonization of processes, increased national ownership of the develop-
ment process and enhancing the effectiveness of aid. Other efforts at aid coordination and harmonization 
include the setting up of the High Level Forum on Harmonization (2003) and the OECD DAC Task Force 
on Donor Practices (2003).31 
The government of Tanzania argues that rather than the current plethora of donors and projects across 
the country, it would be more efficient for donors to provide general budget support. Many donors, includ-
ing the World Bank, DFID and the EU are now moving from basket funding to budget support, while other 
donors - Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland - also support Pov-
erty Reduction Budgetary Support (PRBS), which is combined with the World Bank PRSC credit. 
25 Langerbein H (2000) Does Aid do Harm, D+C Development and Cooperation, No 3, May/June 2000, pg 25 & 26 
26,26,27,28,29 Ibid 
30 Aarnes D ( ) Bubdget Support and Aid Coordination in Tanzania, R eport presented to the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam 
31 AFRODAD (2004 Reality of Aid, Africa Edition 2003/4, AFRODAD 
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From the government of Tanzania's perspective, budget support has three main advantages over other 
forms of aid: 
• Tanzania is extremely aid-dependent. Around 25-30 % of the total Government budget and 80 % of 
the development budget are dependent on foreign aid/finances. This means that predictability and 
flexibility becomes crucially important to get the overall budget process, including resource allo-
cation and macroeconomic management, to function. 
• Tanzania has development co-operation programs with over 50 aid agencies covering hundreds of 
projects virtually in all sectors (TAS, 2002, p6). In this situation, fragmented and uncoordinated 
project aid reduces efficiency and effectiveness of assistance. 
On the other hand, over reliance on donors for budget support means that in the event that donors pull out 
the government will not be able to finance its programes, which will have potential damaging effects on 
the country's overall development planning and implementation, (ibid). 
4.1 Us ing A id to m e e t the M D G s 
The developed world has a responsibility to fund international development programmes. The United 
Kingdom for example previously committed itself to the 0.7% target, (that 0.7% of its gross national income 
(GNI) would be spent on international development). The promise was made in 1970. Some 35 years 
later, we are still waiting for the promise to be kept. Unless this is done, attaining MDGs in countries like 
Tanzania remains a mirage. 
The quality of aid continues to be affected by the tying of donor aid disbursements to donor country goods 
and services. It is estimated that aid tying devalues aid for recipients by up to 30%.32 Aid tying continues to 
be high for a number of donors, despite a recent DAC agreement to untie aid to the least developed 
countries. For example, most aid flows to Tanzania were made conditional on the government privatizing 
the water system in towns such as Dar es Salaam. The move has increased water prices and made poor 
populations more vulnerable to water borne diseases like cholera. Such aid is contrary to the spirit and 
letter of attaining MDGs by 2015 in Africa. 
In fact the portion of ODA that can actually be accessed in any form by developing country partners is 
relatively small. The Reality of Aid CSO project calculated in 1999 that only 37% of bilateral aid was 
available for developing country partners' own spending. The remaining amount was made up of donor-
controlled technical assistance (34%), support to refugees in the donor country (2%), imputed student 
costs for studying in the donor country (1%), debt forgiveness grants by donors (6%), the added cost 
associated with tied aid (1%), emergency relief (10%), and interest received (9%).33 The Millennium 
Project reached a similar conclusion with their estimate that only 24% of bilateral aid is actually available 
to finance real MDG-based development investments on the ground.34 
It is important to note that fifty years of development practice by outside actors suggests that sustained and 
equitable reductions in poverty cannot be "bought" by larger amounts of external resources, nor can it be 
achieved by setting stand-alone targets. National and international economic policies must be put in 
place that enhances the capacities of the poor to gain sustainable livelihoods. 
32 See Tony German, Judith Randel (editors), Reality of Aid 2002 Report, Manila: IBON Foundation, page 15, accessible at 
www.realitvofaid.org. 
33 Reality of Aid 2002, op.cit.. p. 157 
34 The Millennium Project, Investing in Development, op. cit„ January 2005, pages 197-98. 
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5.0 Debt and the M D G s 
Tanzania is a beneficiary of the HIPC Initiative. After receiving HIPC debt relief, Tanzania's external debt fell from $3.8 billion in mid-1999 to $2.6 billion in 2000. However, the relief was only temporary as the 
savings will be spread out over 20 years and Tanzania is continuing to borrow to finance its reform 
programme. Estimates are that Tanzania's debt could increase to US$6 billion by 2015. By then it will be 
paying US$260 million in debt service a year compared with $193 million prior to HIPC.36 
Using the World Bank's sustainability criteria of debt to export ratio, Tanzania's debt will not be sustainable 
until at least 2007. But even then, the sustainability is based on assumptions of future GDP growth averag-
ing 6 % from 2002. But looking at past trends, the projection for GDP growth seems overly optimistic: 
average annual GDP growth was 3% from 1989-99, 4% in 1998 and 4.7% in 1999. 
Debt sustainability is also on the assumption of growth in traditional export volumes to average 4-6 % a 
year and while non traditional exports and tourism are projected to grow faster than GDP. Government 
revenues (excluding grants) are projected to increase from 11.2% of GDP in 1999/00 to 20.7% on average 
from 2009/10-2017/18. However, going by the current progress, this is highly unlikely. Revenue collection 
remains very poor in Tanzania and has been described by some economists as the 'Achilles heel' in the 
country's bid to reduce donor dependency and make its debt sustainable. 
The enhanced HIPC initiative provided a reduction of 52 % of the Net Present Value of Tanzania's debt at 
completion point in 2002. But by 2009/10-2017/18, the level of debt is expected to be only 25 % less than 
it would have been without HIPC. While there was a substantial reduction in debt service initially, in the 
longer term the reduction will be minimal in comparison to the pre-HIPC levels largely because of the 
accumulation of new debt.36 Thus debt service on new debt is expected to rise from US$21.2 million in 
2003/04 to US$52.5 million in 2006/7 and to more than double to US$134.6 million by 2009/10 - 2017/ 
18.37 
Although debt relief has been inadequate, in the context of the MDGs, it has had a positive impact on 
fighting poverty by, for instance, enabling the Government to make primary education free with the conse-
quent sharp rise in primary school enrolment. 
As Tanzania is on track with its reform programme, it has been able to access resources from the IMF and 
the World Bank to finance the reforms and the MDGs. This new lending is creating a new debt burden that 
will shackle the country in the near future. Experience from "successful" reform countries such as Ghana 
and Uganda show that their foreign debt has ballooned rapidly as the IFIs financed their reforms with new 
loans. Tanzania is already getting drawn into the same predicament. 
• Current figures show that Tanzania's debt will not reach sustainability levels despite HIPC. To 
propel growth and achieve the MDGs therefore, there is need for Tanzania to be granted total debt 
cancellation. 
• In the event that total debt cancellation is not possible, Tanzania should add its voice to the calls by 
other African debtor countries for creditors to consider other options to lighten the continent's debt 
burden including debt swaps built around a fair and transparent arbitration process. 
• Even with debt cancellation, there is still need for Tanzania to find other sources of financing for its 
poverty reduction programmes and to achieve the MDGs. Greater effort should be put into broad-
ening the domestic revenue base through taxes by fostering domestic savings. Effort should also go 
into negotiating for grants with donors rather than loans to finance its development. 
• There is need to assess the implications of the higher aggregate spending on the priority areas and 
the recurrent cost implications of such spending on the national debt. 
35 Mutume G (2000) African countries still struggle with heavy debt payments, Africa Recovery, UN 
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Table 3: Tanzania's Debt Situation 
2003/04 2004/05 (projected) 
Gross borrowing 927.4 1,056.8 
Domestic 459.1 497.6 
T-Bills 323.1 296.0 
T-Bonds 136.0 201.6 
Foreign 468.3 559 
Project 303.0 390.9 
Programme 165.2 168.3 
Key sustainability Indicators Jun 2003 Jun 2004 
Domestic Debt/total debt 17.1% 19.6% 
External debt/total debt 82.9% 80.4% 
Total public debt/ GDP 74.5% 79.2% 
Total Public debt/domestic revenue 822.4% 524.9% 
National external debt/ exports 412.7% 557.7% 
Annualised public debt 
service/domestic revenue 
60.9% 37.9% 
Debt Interest 9.4% 9.7% 
Redemptions 51.5% 28.2% 
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Finance 2004/05 Budget Digest 
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6.0 T rade 
Tanzania's economic take off is premised on its ability to take advantage of the opportunities of trade liberalization and globalization. Although exports have risen substantially over the past few years, the 
import bill has been rising even faster creating a huge balance of trade deficit. The structure and level of 
domestic demand remains weak and inadequate to stimulate poverty reducing growth. (URT 2003). 
Between 1979 and 1995, export earnings were barely adequate to meet a third of imports (URT 2003). 
Merchandise exports declined from US$764 million in 1996 to US$542.9 million in 1999. 
Table 4: Tanzania's Foreign Trade 
Foreign Trade by Value (US$m) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total exports 542.9 663.2 776.4 902.5 1 129.6 
Total imports 1 572.6 1536.7 1 714.8 1 661.4 2145.3 
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin 
But since then there has been a steady increase in the value of exports rising by 48 % from US$542.9 
million in 1999 to US$1 129.6 million in 2003. Mining was the biggest contributor to the increased export 
value, rising from a mere US$73.3 million in 1999 to US$540.2 million in 2003 an increase of more than 
395 %, followed by manufacturing whose contribution rose by 331 % from US$30.1 million in 1999 to 
US$99.9 million in 2003. 
In 2003 exports increased by 26.5 % from US$826.28 million in 2002 to US$1,046 million due to improve-
ment both in traditional and non traditional exports. The increase in traditional exports was attributed to 
both volume and price. Agricultural commodities accounted for more than 70 % of merchandise exports 
while manufactured products contributed only about 15 % of exports. 
On the other hand the country's major agricultural exports did not fare well at all during the period, 
particularly cashew nuts and coffee whose export value declined by more than 256 % and 65 % respec-
tively from US$100.9 million in 1999 to US$39.4 million in 2003 for cashew nuts and from US$77 million 
to US$49.9 million for coffee. 
An encouraging trend in Tanzania's export performance is the growing contribution of minerals to exports. 
Until recently when the country opened up its economy, minerals did not feature at all on the country's 
export profile. Also encouraging is the steady rise in the export of manufactured goods, in a country whose 
export base is considered relatively unsophisticated and until recently, inefficient. 
But a worrying factor is the huge shortfall of US$1 015.7 million between the value of export and the value 
of imports, which has to be financed either from borrowing as balance of payment support from the IMF or 
from commercial lines of credit or from invisible exports. There is also scope for increasing invisible 
exports such as tourism, whose growth has averaged 29 % a year in recent years and its contribution to 
revenue has risen from a mere US$65 million in 1989 to US$730 million in 1999. However, meeting the 
resource gap through borrowing will not only increase the country's reliance on donors, but will push up 
the country's foreign debt to unsustainable levels quickly despite HIPC relief. 
Although Tanzania's export earnings are rising rapidly, they are not increasing fast enough to match the 
rising import bill, hence there is a deficit on the trade account. And although revenue collection is also 
increasing, the rate is not sufficient to enable the country to finance its own development and hence there 
is a budget deficit. 
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The only lasting solution to Tanzania's problems is to grow its own economy to the point where it can 
finance development from its own resources. The current trend where the country relies on donors for 
more than 45 % of the national budget is unhealthy and unsustainable in the long term. 
However, Tanzania has made tremendous progress in recent years to put its economy on a growth path 
that will facilitate the achievement of the MDGs. The years of economic decline mean that the country is 
starting from a very low base. For instance, while exports have more than trebled in the last four years 
alone, imports have been rising faster, putting pressure on Balance of Payments. 
Despite measures to grant tax and quota-free access to European and American markets exports from 
developing countries like Tanzania continue to face trade barriers because of subsidies exercised by 
developed countries and other non-tariff barriers such as use of environmental issues by the same. 
Subsidies for agricultural products pose an impossible challenge to Tanzania's effort to export farm 
produce to European markets. It is in this area, however, where Tanzania has comparative advantage that 
would enable it to attain MDGs if given an opportunity for fair competition. Consequently, although Tanza-
nia is benefiting from debt relief under HIPC, it is accumulating debt at a faster rate than it is being forgiven, 
which is creating fresh problems of debt sustainability. 
Tanzania's recovery is fragile and is underpinned by an over-reliance on primary commodities over whose 
prices the country has little control. At the moment, the biggest driver of export recovery is mining, in 
particular gold exports. But earnings from mining could be fall sharply if the price of gold collapses, as it 
has done in the past. Already the prices of agricultural exports have fallen, in particular cashew nuts and 
coffee. 
A scenario in which developing countries are required to open up their markets without meaningful 
access opportunities into the markets of developed countries inevitably leads to de-industrialization in 
developing countries. This has debilitating consequences in terms of growth, employment and the whole 
fight against poverty to attain the MDGs. 
As long as developing countries such as Tanzania do not have a say in the pricing of primary commodities, 
they will not be able to determine how much they can get from their exports but will remain at the mercy of 
international global markets. This coupled with the inverse relationship exports have on imports means 
that countries like Tanzania will find it difficult to achieve debt sustainability even if they increase their level 
of production for primary commodities. 
6.1 M D G s Cos t ing 
Tanzania is one of the six countries for which the UNDP and the World Bank has done the Millennium 
Development Goals costing. The targets for achieving the goals have been set in the PRS. The govern-
ment has not done any MDG costing but uses the financial estimates for the PRSP as the basis for costing 
the priority sectors. The approach followed to derive financing estimates of PRSP was to estimate the 
budgetary requirements of priority sectors and priority activities within them. The priority sectors are 
Education, Health, Water, Agriculture, Roads and Judiciary, plus HIV/AIDS as a crosscutting issue. 
The costing of priority interventions was based partly on the analysis of recurrent cost implications of 
sector programmes and inputs from the PER and MTEF. The cost of health, education, water and roads 
was based on an estimate of the basic unit of service. Estimates of the remainder of the sectors were 
based on PER/MTEF estimates. From these estimates financing requirements were derived for the 
medium term subject to the availability of resources. 
The financing strategy under PRSP centred on government budgetary allocations to priority sectors and 
activities. This was complemented by donor support through basket financing, direct project funds, as 
wells as contributions by private sector, communities, NGOs and other stakeholders. 
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Poverty-reducing interventions outside the priority sectors were financed through allocations to "other 
priorities" (e.g., energy) in the general government budget. The government is implementing policies that 
enhance domestic resource mobilization and gives priority to funding poverty reduction programmes that 
currently consume 46 % of the total expenditure. 
18 A Critical Appraisal of the MDGs - Tanzania 
7.0 Mobi l is ing R e s o u r c e s for the M D G s 
The deadline for the achievement of MDGs is fast approaching. Given the urgent need for additional 
resources to fund the MDGs, various financing options have to be explored soon if Tanzania is to make 
any headway. 
• ODA should be more predictable to allow better planning. To date, the domestic resource base has 
proved more reliable and more predictable than external resources 
• The Implementation of fiscal reforms has resulted in government revenue outturns above targeted 
levels. In fiscal year 2003/04, domestic resources reached $1.4 billion, about 70 % of the minimum 
requirements for the priority sectors identified in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
for 2003 
• Tanzania has gone out of its way to attract external resources to finance its development pro-
grammes. The results have however not matched the efforts. Major expectations out of global 
conferences such as the 20/20 Initiative, UN LDC III (2001) and Monterey are yet to be translated 
into cash 
• HIPC relief is small and inadequate. 
The UN estimates that Tanzania will require about US$2.6bn by the end of 2005 in domestic revenue, 
debt relief, and ODA to make progress on the MDGs. The government on the other hand has budgeted 
US$3.3 billion during fiscal year 2004/05. Although it can only raise US$1.7 billion from internal revenues, 
including taxes and US$101 million from the sale of treasury bills leaving a financing gap of over US$1.5 
billion. The greater part of the financing gap was expected to be financed by bilateral donors, the Euro-
pean Union, concessional loans from the International Financial Institutions, specifically the World Bank 
and the African development fund. Without these resources Tanzania's efforts to meet the MDGs are likely 
to be severely compromised as 35 % of the budget allocations were for social services as Table 6 below 
shows. 
Table 5: Budget Frame for 2001/2 - 2004/5 in US$ Millions 
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Actual Budget Projection Projection 
Domestic revenue 1,191 1,338 1,479 1,661 
Budget support loans and grants 247 330 350 367 
Project loans and grants 336 713 606 515 
HIPC relief (ADB, IMF, WB) 69 91 89 99 
Total Resources 1,857 2,533 2,524 2,642 
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7.1 S t a k e h o l d e r s ' role in the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d a t t a i n m e n t of M D G s 
Implementing and achieving MDGs is a big challenge for the government. The need to build partnerships 
to plan, design, finance and implement MDG-related programmes is crucial. At present few people 
outside the government and donors know anything about the MDGs. Social commitment and popular 
participation by the Tanzanian people has therefore been lacking. The duties and obligations of the 
different stakeholders under the MDGs are not clear. The government views other stakeholders merely as 
consultative partners rather than implementers, advocators and service providers. Apart from some private 
sector players who have secured tenders to provide services to the government, grassroots and civil 
society organisations have been left out and have to get funding from outside the country to implement 
MDG-related programmes. 
7.1.1 T h e Ro le of Civi l Soc ie ty O r g a n i s a t i o n s 
The process of streamlining MDGs into Tanzania's national policy documents was not made clear to 
CSOs. The result is that some NGOs think that the MDG targets were agreed on outside Tanzania's 
Development agenda without their participation. The government and the UNDP country office have 
since organised an awareness workshop to bring the CSOs on board after which the organisations that 
attended formed a group to campaign on the MDGs. Other NGOs are involved in direct implementation of 
the MDGs at grassroots level as well as in the sprawling urban centres. Some CSOs have undertaken to 
monitor the implementation of the MDGs under the PRS programme. 
NGO activities on the MDGs cover certain regions of the country and certain priority areas in food and 
nutrition, health (impact of cost sharing), education (access) and agriculture. However their efforts to 
scale up have been greatly hampered by lack of financial support from the government as well as donor 
community. Most of their activities are funded by small short-term budgets provided by northern CSOs. 
Furthermore a few high-profile CSOs in the capital city attract more donor funding than the rural-based 
CSOs despite their massive contribution to the achievement of MDGs. Another challenge is the lack of 
clearly defined roles for CSOs on MDGs and clear reporting mechanisms on the progress. 
7.1.2 T h e Role of Pr ivate Sector 
The private sector has not participated directly in the implementation of the MDGs. Its role has been 
limited to macro economic policy formulation under the PRGF programme. Local private investors point 
out that the macro economic environment is not conducive to their effective participation in the achieve-
ment of the MDGs. Reasons cited include the high cost of business, highly centralised tax collection 
system, policies hindering the growth of small scale and medium enterprises, insensitive financial sector, 
poor linkages between the agricultural and the industrial and trade sectors, low institutional capacity, low 
product outreach and the encroachment of foreign investors in areas of domestic investors' comparative 
advantage. 
7.1.3 T h e Role of Un i ted Nat ions D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e 
The UNDP is the campaign manager for the MDGs in Tanzania. It facilitated the incorporation of MDGs 
into Tanzania's main national policy - the Tanzania Assistance Strategy, the national Poverty Reduction 
Strategy, the PRSP and the NEP. At the policy and monitoring level, the UNDP has been key in monitoring 
the expenditure programme for the MDGs. It has also facilitated the creation of Tanzania's socio-eco-
nomic database - which provides socio economic indicators on Tanzania. UNDP has also carried out 
research on HIV/AIDS and on agricultural development to strengthen the strategies to achieve these 
targets. 
The UNDP also promotes dialogue between and among stakeholders, provides technical assistance and 
resources to stakeholders who align their programmes with the MDGs. 
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According to a UNDP official in Tanzania, the country's high economic growth will create more resources 
from the increased government revenue to fund the priority sectors. The challenge for Tanzania and its 
development partners, he said, was to solve the policy incoherence (contradiction) between some of the 
PRGF economic reform programmes and achieving the MDGs through poverty reduction. He argued 
that the economic reforms were not as transparent or as participatory as the poverty reduction programmes. 
The main concern was when and how to introduce the programmes to limit their negative impact on 
poverty reduction programmes. There was therefore a need for broader consultation of all the stakeholders, 
he said. 
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8.0 Spec i f ic I m p l e m e n t a b l e R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
8.1 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for G o v e r n m e n t 
• Strong commitments are required from government to increase domestic resource mobilization, 
uphold the principle of rule of law and good governance, intensify the fight against corruption and 
put in place conducive environment to improve effectiveness of aid and attract investments 
• Establish a strong macro-economic linkage through better translation of economic benefits to 
poverty reducing outcomes 
• Maintain support to the priority sectors by increasing their budgetary allocations 
• Take the lead in the implementation of the MDGs and create a conducive environment for the 
participation of other stakeholders in all policy areas, especially in the macro economic sectors 
• Initiate policies and programmes that encourage the implementation of MDG priority areas through 
divestures, and tendering 
• Consider financing NGOs at the grassroots level that have programmes on MDGs 
• Renegotiate with the IMF on programmes that have a negative impact on MDG implementation. 
This has to be done in a transparent and participatory manner to eliminate suspicion from the 
currently non participating members. The government could use the PRS process model to facili-
tate the process 
• Promote public-private partnerships in service delivery, employment creation, and MDG outcome 
reviews. This is especially important in achieving the MDGs without over reliance on foreign assist-
ance 
• Economic growth must focus on creating livelihoods for the poor based on improving their capaci-
ties and assets as well as their access to local finance and markets. This growth must also 
produce jobs in both the formal and informal economies that respect the basic labour rights of the 
working population 
• -Economic reforms must be supportive of the PRS framework. The PRGF must be more participa-
tory and should be adapted to the country's needs 
• Tanzania needs more financial support to achieve its MDGs, therefore policies that discourage 
financial assistance are not a true reflection of the situation in the country. The Tanzania govern-
ment should broaden its macro economic policy discussions beyond the official and private sec-
tors and bring on board other stakeholders especially the civil society organisations 
• There is need to build the country's capacity to collect socio economic data, that can be used to 
improve the policy-making process instead of relying on external policy advisers. In the second 
phase of the implementation of the MDGs, the IFIs, specialized UN agencies and the government 
should work closely together to assess development needs and support a macroeconomic frame-
work that will realistically achieve the MDGs. An explicit MDG-focused macroeconomic planning 
framework should be the guiding principle 
• The trade policy should have strong links with other government policy documents on poverty 
reduction and economic growth. Specifically it needs to adopt appropriate measures to safeguard 
domestic industry and protect investors who are threatened by market liberalisation. There is need 
to protect economic activities that serve household demand to reduce reliance on imports for basic 
commodit ies 
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• Improve the quality and quantity of exports. To achieve this there is need to build the capacity of 
domestic investors to facilitate better product quality and quantity. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
should be encouraged in areas requiring high capital outlay rather than in low capital sectors 
which are more appropriate for local investors 
• Improve the operating environment for investors, paying attention to infrastructure provision, includ-
ing roads. There is also need to speed up tax and financial reforms to ensure the protection of 
small scale enterprises and lessen their difficulties of acquiring capital 
• Align trade policy with regional trade policies to maximise the benefits of participation in regional 
arrangements and strengthen Africa's voice as a trading block in the WTO. 
8.2 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for D e v e l o p e d C o u n t r i e s / D o n o r s 
To make a meaningful contribution to the achievement of the MDGs therefore, donors should consider 
the following actions: 
• Better co-ordination and harmonisation of their activities and the channelling of more resources 
through the budget process to ensure that money is used for programmes identified as national 
priorities 
• Adopt the joint actions approach and harmonised rules and procedures (formulation, supervision 
and evaluation missions; accounting, disbursement and reporting; annual consultations, etc.) to 
enhance Government capacity. The initiatives on basket funds in health, education, Local Govern-
ment Reform Programme (LGRP) and the PRBS provide a basis for the way forward 
• Adopt the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) as the basis for harmonising rules and 
procedures on accounting, disbursement and reporting thereby enhancing transparency and ac-
countability on aid. Currently, the Government and six donors have established a basket fund for the 
implementation of the Health Sector Reform Programme. Disbursements are made through the 
IFMS. Another basket fund involving seven donors has also been established to support implemen-
tation of the LGRP. This initiative will be consolidated and deepened, and extended to other support 
programmes 
• Untie aid and provide technical assistance for capacity building. Some donors have completely 
untied aid while others are still constrained by their national policies and laws 
• Adopt the Medium Term Expenditure Framework to improve the predictability of resources 
• Support approaches which increase aid effectiveness. Financing plans especially from ODA, in 
support of the priority areas towards meeting the MDGs must include recurrent as well as capital 
costs 
• Decentralise decision making to the country missions to expedite and deepen consultations 
• Allocate additional resources to MDGs in the form of grants rather than loans. Even concessional 
loans should be discouraged, given the country's high debt to GDP ratio 
• Reduce trade imbalances at the global level to make them more favourable to developing coun-
tries primary producers. Increase export volumes 
• Increase levels of flows of Foreign Direct Investments to the developing countries. The role of 
Foreign Direct Investment as an important instrument for implementing the MDGs cannot be over 
emphasized 
• Provide essential financing capacities by increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA) espe-
cially grants over concessional loans, along with 100% debt cancellation in order to meet the 
MDGs. 
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C o n c l u s i o n 
The implementation of MDGs will require substantial, new and additional resources from both domes tic and external sources. Strong commitments are required from governments to increase domestic 
resource mobilization, uphold the principle of rule of law and good governance, intensify the fight against 
corruption and put in place conducive environment to improve effectiveness of aid and attract invest-
ments. The Tanzanian Government has put in place a conducive economic environment for the achieve-
ment of the MDGs. The macro economic indicators are positive and encouraging although the social 
indicators require more effort. 
The economic reform programmes which underpin Tanzania's MDG are dictated by the Bretton Wood 
Institutions. A major weakness of the economic reform programme is its pre-occupation with budget 
deficit reduction, increased revenue generation and low inflation instead of expansionist pro-poor spend-
ing and more emphasis on strategies to improve incomes and livelihoods of the poor. The Macroeco-
nomic framework under the PRGF does not take a "needs-based" approach but instead emphasizes a 
cash budget and maintaining budget ceilings. As a result, the high economic growth has failed to perform 
its "catalytic" role to spur poverty reduction and encourage the type of investment that would make a 
difference in reaching the MDGs in Tanzania. 
Tanzania like many other countries recognizes the role and importance of trade in promoting faster 
economic growth and development of nations. However, in the case of Least Developed Countries, the 
key issue in trade development is the need to address supply side constraints. The market access oppor-
tunities for LDCs can only be effective if LDCs are assisted to build their capacities to produce tradable 
goods of higher value and acceptable quality at competitive cost. MDGs will be difficult to attain for a debt-
sustaining Tanzania surviving on exports of raw cashew nuts, coffee, tea, cotton, while importing every-
thing else in the form of industrial goods from abroad, using the foreign exchange earned from primary 
exports. 
Tanzania has been receiving more aid for longer than most other African countries, but over the period 
poverty has instead increased as has aid dependency. Given this scenario, the question arises about the 
quality of the aid delivered and how it was used. Because of the lack of donor co-ordination and harmoni-
sation over the years, the myriad of donors each carved their own territories where they worked on pro-
grammes they thought were best suited to tackle the problems facing the country. The government for its 
part did not have a comprehensive development policy framework with set priorities that donors could 
feed into. The result is that the impact of aid was dissipated across the country and across various sectors. 
The government has now created systems of donor co-ordination and harmonisation that allow donors to 
channel resources in a more systematic manner to fund activities that are national priorities. 
There are also concerns over the slow speed and lack of consistency in ODA flows to Tanzania. These 
have created problems in the implementation of programmes in the priority sectors and generated distrust 
among ordinary Tanzanians on the government's commitment to fight poverty. Delays by donors to honour 
their pledges could undermine the institutional and economic reforms the government has put in place to 
facilitate the process of achieving the MDGs. 
There is need for close collaboration among the different stakeholders to meet the MDGs. Key actors 
include the government, CSOs, the private sector and the general public. However, at the moment there 
is no framework for collaboration among the various players and no clarity of roles. There is therefore a 
need to develop a collaboration framework, which will be crucial especially for resource sharing and 
reviewing progress. 
MDGs should be explicitly situated within a framework of existing human rights treaties and state obliga-
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tions, among others the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Right to Development. 
This focus on rights stresses the obligations of all states, including Northern governments, to give priority 
to their responsibility to make specific efforts to make progress on social and economic rights for all. 
Aid can play a role, but there are other critical policies such as eliminating IMF and World Bank structural 
adjustment conditionalities, democratic governance, cultural factors affecting gender equality, fair trade 
and more equitable international institutions that set limiting parameters for this progress. Goal Eight, 
focusing on North South development partnership, with its weak targets, bias towards trade and invest-
ment liberalization, and lack of timelines, fails to deliver much hope in many of these important areas. 
The absence of radical reforms on the part of developed countries, beyond delivering more aid, an 
exclusive emphasis on MDG targets potentially sets up poor people and poor countries to take the blame 
once again for "their failure" to achieve the unachievable. The emphasis should not be on whether a given 
country is failing or not to meet a given target. Rather, global action and national policy change should be 
based on a democratic assessment of what is required from all countries to give priority to maximum 
sustained progress against poverty. 
Sustainable debt financing on the part of the developing countries is an important element for mobiliz-
ing resources for public and private investment. Exclusion of domestic debt and contingent liabilities in 
the debt sustainability analysis is a concern not only of Tanzania but of the HIPCs, because of its implica-
tions for fiscal resources available for financing poverty reduction. 
The UK is currently seeking support for a proposed 'International Finance Facility' (IFF). Gordon Brown 
has said that the facility could 'double the amount of development aid from $50-100 billion per year... 
double development aid to help us halve poverty'. The proposal for an IFF shows that the UK government 
recognizes that the MDGs are currently out of reach. This admission must lead to an immediate and 
major increase in the volume and efficacy of international aid, with or without international agreement on 
the IFF38. 
The UK has already shown significant leadership on aid volume. It must make a firm commitment to 
reach the 0.7% target and to do so before 2013. It should also provide its fair share of the additional money 
needed now to meet the MDGs, estimated to be at least $50 billion each year. Doing these two things 
would put it in a prime position to persuade other countries to contribute more to international aid. 
Increased aid goes hand-in-hand with fundamental reform of the aid regime in Tanzania; one without the 
other will not be effective in reducing poverty. More aid may not in fact be better aid. This research report 
argues that the call for "more and better aid" for the MDGs must be a call for donors to live up to their 
human rights obligations to maximize resources and make poverty reduction a priority. 
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A n n e x 1 
T h e Mi l l enn ium D e v e l o p m e n t G o a l s and Targets 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
• Halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day. 
• Halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. 
2. Achieve universal primary education 
• Ensure that by 2015 all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling. 
• Promote gender equality and empower women 
• Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2015. 
4. Reduce child mortality 
• Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the mortality rate among children under five. 
5. Improve maternal health 
• Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio. 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
• Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/Aids, malaria and other major diseases by 2015. 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 
• Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse 
loss of environmental resources 
• Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water by 2015 
• Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020. 
8. Develop a global partnership for development 
• Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-
discriminatory (including a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction 
- nationally and internationally); 
• Address the least developed countries' special needs. This includes tariff and quota-free access 
for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; and more generous 
Official Development Assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction; 
• Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing States; 
• Deal comprehensively with developing countries debt problems through national and international 
measures to make debt sustainable in the long term; 
• In cooperation with developing countries, develop decent and productive work for youth; 
• In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in 
developing countries; and 
• In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies - especially 
information and communications technologies. 
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A b o u t A F R O D A D 
AFRODAD Vision 
AFRODAD aspires for an equitable and sustainable development process leading to a prosperous Africa. 
AFRODAD Mission 
To secure policies that will redress the African debt crisis based on a human rights value system. 
AFRODAD Objectives include the following: 
1 To enhance efficient and effective management and use of resources by African governments; 
2 To secure a paradigm shift in the international socio-economic and political world order to a develop-
ment process that addresses the needs and aspirations of the majority of the people in the world. 
3 To facilitate dialogue between civil society and governments on issues related to Debt and develop-
ment in Africa and elsewhere. 
From the vision and the mission statements and from our objectives, it is clear that the Debt crisis, apart 
from being a political, economic and structural issue, has an intrinsic link to human rights. This forms the 
guiding philosophy for our work on Debt and the need to have African external debts cancelled for poverty 
eradication and attainment of social and economic justice. Furthermore, the principle of equity must of 
necessity apply and in this regard, responsibility of creditors and debtors in the debt crisis should be 
acknowledged and assumed by the parties. When this is not done, it is a reflection of failure of governance 
mechanisms at the global level that protect the interests of the weaker nations. The Transparent Arbitra-
tion mechanism proposed by AFRODAD as one way of dealing with the debt crisis finds a fundamental 
basis in this respect. 
AFRODAD aspires for an African and global society that is just (equal access to and fair distribution of 
resources), respects human rights and promotes popular participation as a fundamental right of citizens 
(Arusha Declaration of 1980). In this light, African society should have the space in the global development 
arena to generate its own solutions, uphold good values that ensure that its development process is owned 
and driven by its people and not dominated by markets/profits and international financial institutions. 
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